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Crony Capitalism and Financial System Stability 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
 Prior to the Asian financial crisis, the cozy relationships between corporations, 
governments and banks were seen as a potent force for economic growth and 
development.  In the wake of the crisis these same links were derogated as crony 
capitalism, and blamed for many of the economic ills suffered by the now wounded 
tigers. 
 In this paper, we examine the institution of crony capitalism.  We are interested in 
the extent to which it can both be associated with economic growth and financial crisis.  
We first model the bank-borrowing firm relationship, sans cronies.  The economic 
environment is characterized by moral hazard as borrowers have access to both positive 
and negative expected net present value projects.  Competitive risk-neutral banks can 
induce risk-neutral borrowers to undertake the positive expected net present value 
projects by requiring that the borrowers take an equity stake in the projects.  In 
equilibrium only positive expected net present value projects are funded, banks earn zero 
profits, and, by appealing to the law of large numbers, bankruptcy risk for banks is 
eliminated.   
 We next introduce a crony system under which the government agrees to 
guarantee some percentage of its cronies loan payments in the case of project failure.  
Crony status garners a firm pecuniary and, possibly, nonpecuniary benefits.  The 
government guarantees are off the books (both the governments and the banks) and are 
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not the result of formal legislative or executive action or formal loan negotiation.1  Crony 
lending makes up only a small part of a banks balance sheet, so the attendant risk cannot 
be diversified away.  To ensure their own solvency, banks must put their own capital at 
risk.  Given a firms crony status and the loan guarantee, the bank writes a crony-specific 
loan contract that takes the cronys incentives to undertake the high risk project into 
account as well as the banks need to remain solvent should a cronys project not pay off.   
 In this framework and a generalization thereof in which firms can improve the 
return distribution of the projects they undertake by putting forth unobservable effort, we 
show that financial crisis will occur in our setting only if the government reneges on its 
guarantees:  the government cannot or will not make good on its contingent liabilities.  
We also show that crony systems, in and of themselves, may induce project quality 
improving effort if the nonpecuniary benefits to crony status are high enough.  If this is 
the case, a crony system would not necessarily lead to reductions in output or increases in 
bank portfolio risk, but the demise of a crony system would.   
 While much has been written about the Korean chaebols and the Japanese 
zaibatsu, what some consider to be the classic crony institutional forms, we pare the 
institutional structure of crony capitalism to its bare minimum:  an explicit off-balance-
sheet guarantee on a crony firms loan payments in the event of project failure.  Thus, our 
model bears some resemblance to the models of government loan guarantees (Sosin, 
1980; Chaney and Thakor, 1985; Innes, 1991; Lai, 1992; Li, 1998).  But, a key difference 
emerges between our work and previous work.  Specifically, in previous work social 
welfare, such as safeguarding jobs or protecting an essential industry (e.g. agriculture), is 
                                                 
1 As the reader will see, taxes are legislated to back the government guarantees.  Off the books refers to 
the fact that crony status is absent from the governments books and the banks books. 
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the economic rationale behind the guarantee.  In addition, previous work examines cases 
in which the guarantee is offered only after the firm has already defaulted on its loan.  In 
other words, the guarantee is not a precondition for the loan being made.  In our work, the 
loan contract is written contingent on the borrower having crony status; that is, a loan 
guarantee; the guarantee itself is the mechanism by which those in power redistribute 
wealth away from taxpayers to their cronies. 
While the model design differs from previous work, the results share some 
similarities.  For instance, the efficiency costs of Federal credit programs (Gale, 1991) are 
similar to the efficiency costs of cronyism.  In both cases, the efficiency costs can be 
large; that is, the wealth transfers from taxpayers to the owners of the firm receiving the 
loan guarantee (Selby, et al., 1988) like the wealth transfers to cronies can be high; and a 
firm with a government guaranteed loan (Chaney and Thakor, 1985) like a crony will 
choose riskier projects and a more highly levered capital structure.  However, none of the 
previous work asks how the financial system and overall economic performance may be 
affected, for good or ill, by pervasive cronyism.  We do.2   
Our main results are easily summarized in the following points: 
(1) A bank puts less of its own equity capital at risk, and demands a lower interest 
rate and a smaller loan repayment value in response to an increase in the 
governments loan guarantee rate. 
                                                 
2 The effects on the financial system of crony relationships are similar to those associated with deposit 
insurance.  However, bank portfolio risk is not increased and risk is fairly priced when the crony guarantees 
are introduced.  The ultimate impact on the financial system outcomes are similar if the government 
reneges on the guarantee since it is banks and bank depositors who are hurt ex post. 
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(2) Cronies are more likely to undertake risky projects.  As such, the expected 
output loss is increasing in both the number of cronies and the variance of the 
returns in the risky project. 
(3) Bank solvency is inversely related to the size of the crony loan-guarantee 
program. 
(4) Bank solvency is inversely related to the borrowers equity stake. 
(5) Moral hazard combined with the presence of governments inability to insure 
against aggregate uncertainty means that there are realizations that can 
destablilize an otherwise healthy banking system.   
(6) Any time the loan guarantee is used, there is a transfer from depositors to 
cronies.   
 The paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2, we describe the model economy, 
including the banks decision rules.  We analyze the effects produced by changes in the 
governments loan-guarantee rate in Section 3.  We derive the expected impact of the 
crony loan guarantee in terms of the redistribution of wealth in Section 4.  In Section 5, 
we discuss the ramifications associated with an unexpectedly large number of crony 
defaults.  Specifically, at some point the loan guarantee will swamp the governments 
revenue, producing a potential collapse of the banking system.  In Section 6, we modify 
the economy to consider the effects that greater crony effort would have on loan 
contracts.  In particular, cronies are permitted to vary the intensity level that shows up in 
changing the likelihood that a project will be successful.  A brief summary is presented 
and conclusions are drawn in Section 7.   
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II.  The Model 
The economy exists for three periods:  t = 0, 1, 2.  There is a large number, N, of 
risk-neutral project owners.  Each project owner has initial wealth of w<1 and has access 
to two projects, A and B, both of which require an initial investment of 1.  If project A is 
funded in period 0 it will yield RA>1 in period 1 with probability φA, and 0 with 
probability (1-φA).  If project A is successful in period 1 then the project owner can 
continue the project (with an investment of 1) with payoff RA with probability φA and 0 
with probability (1-φA).  If project A is unsuccessful, the project terminates.  If project B 
is funded in period 0 it will yield RB>1 in period 1 with probability φB and 0 with 
probability (1-φB).  If project B is successful in period 1, a project owner can continue the 
project with an investment of 1.  The distribution of payoffs is identical across time 
periods. If project B is unsuccessful, the project terminates. Assume φARA>1>φBRB, but  
RA <RB (so φA >φB):  project B is riskier (and has negative net present value).  Assume 
cash flows are observable, but project choice is not.  Further assume that project returns 
are i.i.d. 
There is a large number, D, of risk averse individuals, each of whom is endowed 
with d<1 units of the consumption good in the initial period and zero in subsequent 
periods.  Agents have time separable preferences, deriving utility from consumption in 
periods 1 and 2.  That is, for each agent preferences can be stated as u(c1) +u(c2), 
u′(ci)>0, u′′(ci) ≤0, u′(0)=∞ for i = 1, 2.  Consumption takes place in periods 1 and 2 
only.  To consume in both periods agents must lend their endowments to banks.  Assume 
that dD>>N  and ½dD>>φAN so that all projects could be funded initially with deposits 
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alone and all successful projects can be refinanced with deposits alone:  there are no 
liquidity problems inherent in the system. 
 There are many perfectly competitive, risk neutral banks that can borrow at the 
risk free rate, 0, if they offer a certain return.  Each bank is initially endowed with k ≥0 
units of wealth (this can be thought of as equity capital). 3  Banks have access to a storage 
technology that allows them to transform units of time t goods into units of time t+1 
goods one for one.  Competition among banks will drive the interest rate paid on deposits 
to the rate of return on storage. 
 There is a government that may have a crony relationship with a positive fraction 
of the borrowers.  If the government does have a crony relationship with a borrower, it 
agrees to guarantee some percentage, η≤100, of the borrowers loan payment in the event 
that the funded project fails.  Any loans extended at period 1 are also guaranteed at the 
same rate.  We will assume that the government does not extract any rents.   
 
2.1 The Baseline (No Crony) Case 
 Assume initially that the government does not have a crony relationship with any 
of the borrowers.  A bank prices a loan  
(i) assuming that the borrower will choose project A  
(ii) assuming that it will roll the loan over if A is chosen and is successful 
(iii) knowing that if the borrower chooses project B and is successful the bank 
will know that it violated the contract (since cash flows are observable) 
and will not roll the loan over. 
                                                 
3 See Hancock and Wilcox (1998) for an analysis on the interaction between bank size and loan guarantees 
operated by the Small Business Administration in the United States. 
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Then, the bank requires the firm to place its wealth in a risk free account, which reverts to 
the bank should the project fail, and demands repayment n1 such that its expected first 
period gross return is 1 
 φAn1 + (1-φA)w = 1 ⇒ n1 = [1- (1-φA)w]/ φA.     (1) 
Equation (1) simply says that the bank is willing to loan goods if and only if expected 
receipts from loan repayment and collateral confiscation equal the guaranteed return from 
storage. 
If A is undertaken and is successful, the firm as of period 1 has wealth of RA+w-
n1, which may exceed unity.  If so, the firm can and will self-finance.  Suppose, however, 
that RA+w-n1<1.  The bank prices a loan to the firm (now locked into project A) requiring 
the repayment of n2 such that  
  φAn2 + (1-φA)[RA+w-n1] = 1 ⇒ n2 = [1- (1-φA)(RA+w-m)]/ φA.  (2) 
 For the borrower to be willing to accept the initial loan, it must be the case that its 
expected value at the beginning of period 1, (RA+w-n1)φA, exceeds its wealth, w (the 
participation constraint is satisfied).  At date t=0 the borrower also evaluates the value of 
the initial loan package, subsequent rollover and repayment.  We assume the net proceeds 
from the successful first-period project are applied as collateral for the second period 
loan.  Thus,   
 (φA)2(RA+(RA+w-n1)-n2) > w ⇒ (1+φA)( φARA-1) > 0.   (3) 
Conditioned on the first-period loan being acceptable, the date t=0 agent is willing to 
participate in a rollover loan if the expected revenues from the rollover loan plus the 
expected proceeds from the first-period loan are greater than the endowment.  The loan 
package is acceptable.   
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 Given that the bank has priced the loan as if Project A is chosen, the natural 
question is whether the borrower will indeed choose Project A over Project B?  The 
borrower will accept the loan and choose project A if the expected value of the firm is 
higher than if it were to choose project B.  The expected value of the firm if it chooses 
project B given that the bank priced the loan assuming that project A would be chosen is 
(RB+w-n1)φB, since if the borrower does choose B and is successful the bank will not roll 
the loan over (since cash flows are observable), and the borrower never chooses to self-
finance a negative expected net present value project. Thus the borrower will choose A if 
 (φA)2 (RA+(RA+w-n1)-n2) > (RB+w-n1)φB 
⇒ (1+φA)(φARA-1) +w > (φARB+w-1)φB/φA 
Assume that this condition holds (otherwise the bank will not lend and the market will 
collapse).   
 By the law of large numbers and i.i.d. project returns, the bank earns zero profits 
with certainty, can repay depositors at the risk free rate of return (the return on storage) 
with certainty, and the individual borrower earns positive expected profits.  Bank capital, 
either stored or invested, also earns the risk free rate of return, and is not at risk.   
 
2.2  Cronies with (Ironclad) Government Guarantees 
In this section, we modify the model economy.  Suppose the government has 
crony relationships with N2 borrowers, and has no relationship with the other N1 
borrowers; note N1 + N2 = N.  If the government has a crony relationship with a 
borrower, it guarantees η% of the borrowers loan payment in the event that the funded 
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project fails.  A crony borrower is costlessly identifiable to the bank but not necessarily to 
depositors or non-crony borrowers.4   
 For non-crony borrowers the situation is as before.  With N2/N1 small, the law of 
large numbers still applies to non-crony lending.  For cronies, however, the situation has 
changed since the government now guarantees some fraction of their loan payments if 
their projects do not succeed.  Because the number of cronies is small, the risk associated 
with crony loans cannot be diversified away.  As a result, for the bank to be able to meet 
its contractual obligations to its depositors, it may need to put its capital at risk and/or to 
require that cronies collateralize their borrowing.   
With government guarantees in place, the governments budget constraint 
becomes especially important.  For simplicity, we assume that the government does 
nothing at date t = 0.  We assume the government commits to a pattern of tax collections, 
imposing a lump sum tax of τt on all depositors at dates t =1,2.  It can also borrow at date 
t =1.  (Obviously, borrowing is not an option in period 2.)  The government also sets the 
crony loan guarantee rate, η.  Note that whatever the government guarantee does not 
cover, the bank and/or its depositors absorb.   
Table 1 summarizes expenses and revenues at each relevant date. 
Table 1 
Period-by-period Government Activity 
 
Date Expected Expenses Revenues 
1 (1-φ)N2ηc1 Nτ1+b 
2 φ(1-φ)N2ηc2+Rbb Nτ2 
 
                                                 
4 There are plenty of examples of government loan guarantees that do not require crony status.  See, for 
example, discussions in Riding (1997) and Thornton (1997).   
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We adopt the following notation: b is the quantity of government debt issued, Rb is the 
real return on government bonds, τt is the date-t lump-sum tax, and ct is the loan 
repayment in period t.  Thus, the expected present value government revenues are  
bR
NN 21
τ
τ +             (5) 
while expected present value government expenditures are 
 bR
cNcN 2212
)1( ηφφ
φη
−
+ .       (6) 
Throughout our analysis, we will assume that the gross real return to government 
bonds is equal to the risk-free rate; thus, Rb = 1.  In addition, the government smooths 
taxes across periods so that τ1 = τ2 = τ.  Hence, if the expected present value of expenses 
is equal to or less than the present value of revenues the government can meet its 
expected contingent liabilities   
( ) τηφφηφ NcNcN 21)1( 2212 ≤−+−       (7)  
otherwise the banks and possibly their depositors must absorb the losses.  We assume 
throughout our analysis that τ and η are known and the government can pre-commit to 
each level.  Should tax revenues exceed the value of the governments realized liability, 
the excess is returned to depositors. 
Unlike the no-crony case, there are a number of contracts banks can offer crony 
borrowers.  We consider three.  Under Contract 1 the bank puts its own capital at risk but 
does not require the crony borrower to collateralize the loan.  Under Contract II the bank 
puts its capital at risk and requires the crony to collateralize the loan.  Under Contract III 
the bank does not put its capital at risk but requires the crony to collateralize the loan.  
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We will examine the three contracts in turn.  For notational simplicity we will drop the 
project identifying superscripts unless required for clarity. 
 
2.3 Loan Contract I: Bank Capital, No Collateral 
 The bank sets contract terms:  loan repayment, c, interest rate, r, and its capital 
holdings per crony loan, k, such that k≤ k~ , where k~ =
2N
k  is bank capital per crony loan, 
in period 0 and then again in period 1 (since, from the perspective of the bank, the loans 
are identical).  For the bank to be willing to lend three conditions must be satisfied.  First, 
the sum of actual crony payments and bank capital must meet the deposits backing the 
crony loans in all states.  This solvency condition is written as: 
1=+ kcη          (8) 
Because the bank is putting up its own capital, the expected return to crony loans must 
exceed the return to storage to compensate the bank for risk taking.  That is,  
rcc +=−+ 1)1( ηφφ         (9) 
Lastly, on average, the banks capital stock is unchanged.  In the good state, the bank 
receives (net) r goods from the crony loans and in the bad state there is a net loss of ηc-1 
goods such that the following condition holds   
 ( ) kcr =−−+ 1)1( ηφφ        (10) 
Together equations (8)  (10) can be used to solve for the repayment level, the 
size of bank capital, and the real interest rate. 
)1(2
2
2 ηφη −+
=c         (11) 
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)1(2
)1(
2
2
ηφη
ηφ
−+
−
=k         (12) 
 
)1(2
)1)(2(
2 ηφη
ηφφ
−+
−−
=r         (13) 
The expected value of the crony firm under this contract is 
 ]
)1(2
2)1[( 2 wR +





−+
−+
ηφη
φφ       (14) 
The firm chooses to undertake project A or B depending on which generates the highest 
firm value.  The bank first prices A assuming the crony will choose A, and then 
determines whether the crony will instead choose B.  If so, the bank prices B.  Thus the 
bank offers the crony the contract consistent with the cronys profit maximizing choice 
given that it undertakes the project for which the loan is priced.   
 
2.4  Loan Contract II:  Collateral and Bank Capital 
Should the bank require that the firm put up collateral and the bank puts up capital 
as well, it must be that w<1-η since if the loan fails repayment is less than what is 
required to repay depositors in full.  The bank sets contract terms in period 0, given 
k1≤ k
~ , such that it is solvent in all states 
 111 =++ kwcη         (15) 
that it compensates its owners for risk taking 
111 1)1()1( rwcc +=−+−+ φηφφ       (16) 
and that the expected value of its capital is unchanged 
 111 )1)(1( kwcr =−+−+ ηφφ .       (17) 
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 Together equations (15)  (17) can be used to solve for the repayment level, the 
size of bank capital, and the real interest rate.  
 
)1(2
)2(2
2
2
1 ηφη
φ
−+
−−
=
wc         (18) 
 
)1(2
)1(
2
2
1 ηφη
ηφ
−+
−−
=
wk         (19) 
 
)1(2
)1(
21 ηφη
ηφ
−+
−−
=
wr         (20)  
If R-c1+w>1-η, then c2=1, k2=0, and r2=0 since the bank does not need to put its capital 
at risk to ensure that depositors are paid in full.  Assume this is the case 
 
2.5 Loan Contract III:  Collateral, No Bank Capital  
If w>1-η the bank can require that the crony put up collateral, and that collateral 
will, along with the government payments, fully cover the banks costs.  The bank sets 
contract terms in period 0 and period 1 to solve 
 11)1)(1()1( =⇒=−−+−+ cccc ηφηφφ .     (21) 
 
III. Comparative Statics: The Effects of Loan Guarantees 
In this section, we analyze the effects that changes loan guarantee rate, η, would have on 
the features of the optimal loan contract and on the expected level of capital projects.  
 
Proposition 1:  Consider an increase in the crony loan guarantee rate, η.  Under 
Contracts I and II, one sees (i) a decrease in bank capital, (k); (ii) a decrease in the real 
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interest rate (r); and (iii) and a decrease in the loan repayment, (c).  A change in the 
crony guarantee rate, however, has no effect on loan repayment schedule for contract III.   
Proof: The proof follows immediately from equations (11)-(13) for contract I, equations 
(18)-(20) for contract II, and equation (21) for contract III.■  
 
 The loan guarantee reduces the risk to the bank of lending.  Thus, the greater the 
guarantee, the less capital the bank needs to ensure its solvency, the lower the return 
required on its capital, and the lower the repayment required from the borrower.  The 
lower repayment schedule increases the expected return to the borrower, thus making the 
crony better off.    
 
3.1  Deadweight Loss of Cronyism 
 The government guarantee of some fraction of a cronys loan payments affects the 
loan contract the bank writes as well as the project that generates the highest profits for 
the crony firm.  What is not altered is the number of risky loans financed by the banking 
industry.  We interpret the product generated by the projects as GDP.  With this 
interpretation and with all banks operating competitively, it is straightforward to compute 
expected  ex ante GDP generated on risky lending.5  Formally,  
 ]]1)1[([0 wRNGDPE
AAA
nocronies +−+= φφ      (22) 
 ]]1)1[([  0 wRNGDPE
AAA
all do Acronies +−+= φφ     (23) 
 ]]1)1[([]]1)1[([ 21  0 wRNwRNGDPE
BBBAAA
all do Bcronies +−+++−+= φφφφ  (24) 
                                                 
5 Here, competition means that there is no incentive for any bank to write a different contract.  
Consequently, all banks write the same contracts.  Ex ante is formalized in the notion of the expected level 
of GDP conditioned on what agents know at date t = 0. 
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where Ei is the mathematical expectation taken as of period i.  Clearly, if all cronies 
undertake project A there is no deadweight loss of cronyism to the economy.  However, if 
all cronies undertake project B the expected deadweight loss of cronyism is 
 )]()1()1([20
BABBBAAA RRNDWLE φφφφφφ −−+−+= .   (25) 
We summarize our findings with respect to the deadweight loss associated with crony 
loan guarantees in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 2: (i) The expected deadweight loss created by crony loan guarantees is 
positively related to the number of cronies designated; (ii) all else equal, the expected 
deadweight loss is positively related to the variance of returns for project B.     
Proof:  (i)  Obvious.  (ii)  Holding φA and RA constant, and subjecting the return 
distribution of project B to a mean preserving spread (φBRB constant via a reduction in φB 
and an increase in RB) yields  
 0)1(2
0 >−=
∂
∂ BB
MPSB RN
DWLE
φ
φ
.■ 
 
IV. Wealth Redistribution 
 Because the government imposes taxes to pay for the contingent liabilities 
generated by its crony relationships, cronyism redistributes wealth away from taxpayers 
to cronies and their bankers.  All taxes are imposed on depositors.  To compute the 
redistributions of wealth as a result of cronyism we first have to compute depositor, bank, 
and firm wealth without cronies, and then compute each groups wealth with cronyism, 
and then compute the difference.   Throughout this section we will maintain the 
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assumption that the governments tax revenues are sufficient to cover all its expected as 
well as realized liabilities. 
We will examine the expected wealth distribution as a result of risky lending only.     
 
4.1 Wealth Distributions for the No-Crony Case 
 NealthDepositorWE =)(0  
 0)(0 =BankWealthE  
 ])1)(1[()(0 wRNFirmWealthE
AAA +−+= φφ  
In the no-crony case, depositors earn the risk free rate of return on their deposits, bank 
capital is not put at risk (it is stored or replaces depositor funds one to one), and firms are 
rewarded for their risk taking.   
 
4.2  Wealth Distribution/Redistribution for Crony Case Contract I 
 We assume that the government sets the lump-sum tax high enough so that it can 
meet all its contingent liabilities, at least in expectation.  The distribution of wealth is as 
follows. 
 





−+
−
−=
)1(2
)1(2)( 2
2
20 ηφη
φηNNealthDepositorWE     (26) 
where the second term in equation (26) is the expected net tax liability as a result of all 
crony lending and where superscripts are absent both cases (project A undertaken or 
project B undertaken) are simultaneously represented.   
 





−+
−−
+=
)1(2
)1)(2()1()( 220 ηφη
ηφφ
φNBankWealthE     (27) 
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 ])1)(1[()( 10 wRNrmWealthNoncronyFiE
AAA +−+= φφ    (28) 
 





+





−+
−+= wRNealthCronyFirmWE
)1(2
2)1()( 220 ηφη
φφ   (29)  
Because the tax scheme transfers wealth from depositors to banks and cronies, the second 
term in equation (26) represents the size of the expected transfer payment.  Banks receive 
part of the redistributed wealth as a result of their need to put some or all of their capital 
at risk to meet their contractual liabilities to their depositors under the crony system.   
 
4.3 Wealth Distribution/Redistribution Crony Case Contract II 
 





−+
−+
−−−
−= ηφφ
ηφη
φηφ )1(
)1(2
)]2(2[)1()( 2
2
20
wNNealthDepositorWE  (30) 
 





−+
−−
=
)1(2
)1()( 220 ηφη
ηφ wNBankWealthE      (31) 
 ])1)(1[()( 10 wRNrmWealthNoncronyFiE
AAA +−+= φφ    (32) 
















−−−






−+
−−
−−−−+
=
)1)(1(                            
)1(2
2(2)21()1(
)(
2
)2
2
20
ηφ
ηφη
φ
φφφφ
wwR
NealthCronyFirmWE   (33) 
Again, equation (30) indicates that depositors expect a transfer payment from themselves 
to banks and cronies in contract II. 
 
4.4  Wealth Distribution/Redistribution Crony Case Contract III 
ηφ )1()( 220 −−= NNealthDepositorWE      (34) 
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 0=BankWealth         (35) 
 ])1)(1[()( 10 wRNrmWealthNoncronyFiE
AAA +−+= φφ    (36) 
 )]1)(1()1)(1([)( 220 ηφφφ −−−+−+= wRNealthCronyFirmWE   (37)  
Since banks do not put their capital at risk under contract III, the expected transfer 
payment from depositor [see equation (34)] goes entirely to crony firms.   
 
4.5 Findings 
 Clearly, the institution of crony lending funded via taxes on deposits impoverishes 
taxpayers, but it need not undermine the stability of the financial system should tax 
revenues be sufficient in all states to cover the governments contingent liability.  
Moreover, it may be difficult to distinguish a financial system characterized by cronyism 
from one absent cronyism.  In both systems, collateralized lending may be the norm and 
crony lending can actually improve bank profitability.   
  
V.  Government Revenue Shortfall 
 Now suppose that the governments tax revenues are inadequate to meet its 
realized liability to the banks.  This forces the government to renege during period 1 on 
some of its crony loan guarantees. 6  Specifically assume that γ1% of crony loans are 
successful (γ1 may differ from φ since the law of large numbers does not apply), γ2% of 
crony loans fail and the government reneges on its implicit guarantees of these loans, and 
                                                 
6 We are not thinking of the government as practicing time-inconsistent behavior.  Remember, the 
government commits to a path of tax collections.  In come circumstances, the small number of crony loans 
means there is uninsurable aggregate risk.  Suppose the tax-commitment technology keeps the government 
from changing its tax revenues by enough to support the revenue shortfall. This could be because the tax 
rate is set too low given the guarantee rate, the guarantee rate is set too high given the tax rate, or because 
an exceptionally large percentage of crony loans fails.  See Cowling (1995) for an analysis of the United 
Kingdoms loan guarantee program.  
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(1-γ1-γ2)% of crony loans fail and the government does not renege.  The question is, do 
the banks have the capital to absorb the losses and remain solvent?  Clearly for contract 
III, the bank will fail because the bank does not hold capital.  For both contracts I and II, 
there is the possibility of solvency. 
 
5.1 Conditions for Solvency under Contract I 
Proposition 3:  The bank is more likely to remain solvent the more successful crony 
loans there are and the smaller the share of the crony loans the government had 
promised to guarantee.   
Proof:  Under contract I the banks revenues are 
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Thus, to remain solvent it must be the case that 
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 Should the bank remain solvent, its capital is depleted.  In other words, its t =1 
capital stock is smaller than k units per successful crony loan.  The bank must either 
ration credit to cronies or raise more capital.  Should the government want the banks to 
continue to lend to all remaining cronies given the banks depleted capital position, the 
government would have to increase its guarantee rate on the remaining crony loans.  
 20 
Otherwise, capital levels are insufficient to insure solvency.7  Thus, any attempt to 
dismantle the crony system may put the stability of the financial system at risk.  For 
instance, if the government reduces tax revenues dedicated to funding the system, bank 
solvency is at risk.   
 
5.2 Conditions for Solvency under Contract II 
Proposition 4:  The bank is more likely to remain solvent the more successful crony 
loans there are and the smaller the share of the crony loans the government had 
promised to guarantee and/or the lower firms equity share.    
Proof:  Under contract II the banks revenues are 
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and the banks costs under contract II are 
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The bank remains solvent if 
 22
1
2
)]1(1[
)1(
γ
φη
ηγφ
>
−−
−−+
w
ww .■ 
 
The final result appears at first to be counterintuitive.  However, the greater firms equity 
share the smaller the banks required capital holdings, and thus the less able the bank will 
be to withstand a loss of government funds.   
                                                 
7 Recall in Proposition 1 that the banks capital is decreasing in the loan-guarantee rate. 
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5.3  Bank Solvency in a Riskier Environment 
Corollary to Proposition 2:  All else equal, an increase in the riskiness of Project B, 
increases the probability that the government will renege on its implicit loan guarantees. 
Proof:  By Proposition 2, holding φA and RA constant, and subjecting the return 
distribution of project B to a mean preserving spread yields a higher deadweight loss of 
the crony system, that is an increase in the government contingent liability.  Since tax 
rates do not adjust, there is a greater chance that the governments revenues will be less 
than its liabilities.■ 
 
5.4 Capital Adequacy Requirements 
 The contracts analyzed above require that the banks remain solvent in all states 
conditional on the government meeting its contingent liability.  Clearly, externally, rather 
than internally, set capital requirements (say those set by international agreement such as 
the Basel Accords) that do not take the particular institutional structure of the banking 
market into account need not be adequate to achieve bank solvency.  A risk-based capital 
requirement that did not account for the possibility of the government reneging on its 
implicit contract would generally set capital requirements too low.  Capital requirements 
that ignored the implicit guarantee altogether (ignored the guarantee and just evaluated 
banks portfolios without taking off balance sheet contingent assets into account) would 
set capital requirements too high and would induce the usual effect of making banks 
portfolios more risky.     
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VI.  Nonpecuniary Benefits and Firm Effort 
Heretofore in this paper we have assumed some firms are cronies and others are 
not, and the only value of cronyism is that it increases the cronies wealth.  We now 
consider a case in which cronies obtain nonpecuniary as well as pecuniary benefits.8  If 
the nonpecuniary benefits are valuable enough, firms will want to maintain their crony 
status.  To do so, suppose that crony status is linked to a crony firms project being 
successful.  Consider a case in which all firms have the ability to improve the return 
distribution on their projects (the probability that a project will be successful) by putting 
forth unobservable effort.  Since this effort is unobservable (it does not change 
observable cash flows), loan contracts cannot be written contingent upon it.  Thus, loan 
contracts in this revised scenario will be written on the underlying distribution, as in the 
basic model, not the effort-enhanced distribution.    
 Define ei as the effort expended by a firm in period i, i = 0, 1 and let φ(e) be the 
probability of a project being successful, φ'(e)>0, φ''(e)<0, and V(e) be the cost of 
undertaking that effort, V'(e)>0, V''(e)>0.  A noncrony firm, taking the loan repayment 
schedule as given, chooses e0≥0 and e1≥0 to solve 
 11001002110 )()()()])(()[(max eeeVeeVnRenRe µµφφφ −−−−−+−   
where the µi for i=1,2 is the Lagrange multiplier for inequality constraint i.  If the 
following condition is satisfied, 
 )0(')1)(0(' VR <+φφ         (38) 
                                                 
8 Such benefits would include factors not included in loan guarantees for investment projects.  For instance, 
cronies may have special privileges that raise welfare.  We leave these specific details out and simply 
include as being determined outside the model economy. 
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then non-cronies will never find it to their benefit to undertake effort.  If the inequality in 
equation (38) holds, a non-crony firm at date 0 will not put forth effort to increase the 
probability that the project will succeed in period 1.  The intuition is straightforward; 
equation (38) represents the condition in which the marginal cost of effort exceeds the 
marginal benefit.9 
Crony status is awarded in period 0 prior to the initial loans being granted.  
Cronies, taking the loan repayment schedule as given, choose e0≥0 and e1≥0 to solve 
110010002110 )()()()()])(()[(max eeeVeeVecRecRe λλφβφφφ ++−−+−+−  
where β is the nonpecuniary benefit of maintaining ones crony status in period 1, and the 
λi, i=1,2 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the inequality constraint i.  The first-
order conditions are 
 0)(']))(()[(' 002110 =+−+−+− λβφφ eVcRecRe    
 0)('))((' 1121 =+−− λφ eVcRe . 
Under the condition for no effort by non-cronies, e1=0 and e0>0 if β is large enough.  
Clearly, if projects could be renewed for more than two periods, the incentives provided 
by the nonpecuniary benefits of crony status would potentially induce effort beyond the 
initial period.   
 What this extended model suggests is that as long as crony status brings with it 
adequate additional benefits, cronyism can generate increases in output and imply only 
small contingent liabilities for the government (taxpayers).  The banking system would 
be stable and profitable, and portfolio risk would be low.  The knowledge that a bank had 
                                                 
9 Equation (38) is stated in terms of a local result.  With strict concavity of the benefit function and strict 
convexity of the efforts cost function, the result implies a global result. 
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lent to cronies would not undermine confidence in the bank.  On the contrary, banks that 
were part of the crony system would be more profitable than their counterparts who 
eschewed the system.   
Should, however, the nonpecuniary benefits fall, as a result, for example, of a 
long governing party being voted out of office, as in Mexico and Taiwan, then the 
incentives to put forth effort would also fall.  In addition, the potential that the 
government will renege would rise.  A financial crisis may be the outcome of 
improvements in democracy (or of a changing of the guard in which loyalty to the old 
guard may put one out of favor with the new).   
 
VII.  Conclusion 
 
 The model developed in this paper examines the effects of cronyism on financial 
system stability and economic output and its distribution.  We find that crony systems are 
not inherently unstable, and need not lead to reductions in GDP or extortionate taxation, 
although in practice they may lead to both.  Whatever the effects of cronyism, it is the 
collapse of the system, characterized by the government reneging on crony loans, and/or 
the nonpecuniary benefits of crony status falling, which puts the financial system at risk.   
The collapse of the crony system is a systemic shock, the type of shock that 
banks, even well run banks, cannot protect themselves against.  This being the case, 
policies aimed at reforming financial systems characterized by pervasive cronyism must 
take the institutional features of cronyism into account in designing the reform process.  
Banks as well as firms must be weaned off the crony system.  Banks must be given the 
time to build up their capital reserves so that they can remain solvent when crony 
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payments are no longer forthcoming.  Crony firms must be given the time to transfer their 
resources into positive net present value projects.  Depositors and non-crony borrowers 
interests should be protected, and maintaining while reforming the financial system will 
do this.  Shock treatment or a short timetable for reform may root out the cronies but take 
down everyone else as well.   
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